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n just a few years, the 
Supreme Court has meaning-
fully altered the landscape 
for establishing personal jurisdiction 
over corporations. Its quartet of unan-
imous and nearly unanimous decisions 
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown,1 Daimler AG v. Bauman,2 
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,3 and 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court of California4 substantially reca-
librated the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process analysis for corporate 
personal jurisdiction established more 
than 80 years ago in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington.5 Its more 
divided 4-2-3 decision in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro6 during 
the same period has heightened con-
cern about the realities of establishing 
jurisdiction over foreign companies 
in an increasingly global marketplace. 
These developments impact both state 
and corresponding federal district 
courts: Pursuant to Federal Rule 4(k)
(1)(A) and long-standing federal prec-
edent, federal courts ordinarily follow 
state law in determining the bounds of 
their jurisdiction for diversity, alien-
age, and even federal question matters 
for which Congress has not specifically 
provided for nationwide jurisdiction. 
This article, which summarizes a 
much more extensive analysis pub-
lished in the Rutgers Law Review,7 
examines these decisions’ potential 
impact on class actions and other com-
plex litigation and provides specific 
recommendations to protect plaintiffs’ 
access to a reasonable forum that is 
also fair to the defendants. 
GIVING INTERNATIONAL SHOE 
A SHINE — OR THE BOOT?
As every law student learned in first-
year Civil Procedure, International 
Shoe introduced the minimum con-
tacts-based, “fair play and substantial 
justice” analysis for personal juris-
diction. International Shoe changed 
the reigning analysis — from the 
question of whether the state has 
physical power over a defendant by 
virtue of physical presence and service 
of process, as articulated in Pennoyer 
v. Neff,8 to whether the defendant’s 
contacts with the state are of such 
quality and quantity that it would be 
fundamentally fair and reasonable to 
subject the defendant to jurisdiction, 
either for a specific claim or generally 
for all claims.9
Addressing jurisdiction over a corpo-
ration, International Shoe established, 
in substance, a continuum. At one end 
were contacts clearly evincing the 
proper assertion of jurisdiction — 
such as a corporation maintaining its 
“home” or “principal place of business” 
in the state, or having “continuous cor-
porate operations . . . so substantial and 
of such a nature” as to allow jurisdic-
tion over any lawsuit against it there 
(what later came to be termed “gen-
eral” jurisdiction). Further along the 
continuum were lesser contacts that 
still warranted jurisdiction — such as 
“when the activities of the corporation 
. . . have not only been continuous and 
systematic, but also give rise to the 
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liabilities sued on” and even some “sin-
gle or occasional acts” in the state that 
“because of their nature and quality 
and the circumstances of their com-
mission, may be deemed to render the 
corporation liable to suit” (what later 
came to be termed “specific” jurisdic-
tion). At the other end of the continuum 
were contacts that were insufficient to 
justify jurisdiction — such as those that 
were too fleeting and unrelated to the 
lawsuit to justify jurisdiction.10 
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s 
opinion in International Shoe con-
firmed that the analysis envisioned by 
the Court was intended to be a flexible 
one, based on the continuum of a cor-
poration’s qualitative and quantitative 
corporate contacts with a state: 
It is evident that the criteria by 
which we mark the boundary line 
between those activities which 
justify the subjection of a corpo-
ration to suit and those which do 
not cannot be simply mechanical or 
quantitative. . . . Whether due pro-
cess is satisfied must depend rather 
upon the quality and nature of the 
activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws 
which it was the purpose of the due 
process clause to insure.11
International Shoe was followed by 
the enactment of long-arm jurisdic-
tion statutes in all states and led to 
decades of litigation and commen-
tary over how much “doing business” 
in a state should be required for the 
exercise of general, all-purpose juris-
diction and how much connection a 
state must have to the plaintiff’s claims 
in a lawsuit for the exercise of specific, 
claim-related jurisdiction. In particu-
lar, the post-International Shoe courts 
commonly allowed general jurisdic-
tion over corporations based upon the 
company doing “continuous and sub-
stantial business” in the state.12
The Supreme Court’s quartet of deci-
sions in Goodyear, Daimler, BNSF, and 
Bristol-Myers, while reaffirming the 
decision as “canonical,”13 substantially 
recast the more flexible International 
Shoe jurisdictional continuum into a 
brighter-line, stricter dichotomy that 
is both reflective of the post-Inter-
national Shoe concepts of “general” 
versus “specific” jurisdiction and 
more protective against forum shop-
ping. Under this new dichotomy, for 
a corporation to be subject to gen-
eral (all-purpose) jurisdiction, the 
firm must be essentially “at home” in 
the state, such as being incorporated 
or having its principal place of busi-
ness there.14 Otherwise, only specific 
(claim-connected) jurisdiction is con-
stitutionally permissible: Even if the 
defendant does very substantial, con-
tinuous business in a state in which it 
is not “at home,” each plaintiff’s claim 
must “arise out of or relate to” the 
company’s contacts with the state in 
order to establish personal jurisdic-
tion.15 The Court also emphasized in 
the quartet of decisions that general 
jurisdiction should be the exception 
to the rule that, ordinarily, jurisdiction 
should be specific, based on the compa-
ny’s claim-connections to the state.16 
Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF:  
The “At Home” Requirement
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored 
the Court’s 2011 unanimous decision 
in Goodyear, holding that due process 
would not permit North Carolina courts 
to subject three European Goodyear 
subsidiaries to general jurisdiction for 
a vehicle accident that took place in 
Europe. The case presented product 
liability claims brought on behalf of 
North Carolina citizens injured in an 
accident in France involving a car with 
Goodyear-brand tires manufactured 
and distributed by the three European 
subsidiaries. The North Carolina 
courts had justified jurisdiction over 
the subsidiaries based on their having 
placed the tires in the global “stream 
of commerce” — even though only 
a tiny percentage of tires manufac-
tured by these subsidiaries came to be 
sold in North Carolina, the particular 
tires at issue were not sold into North 
Carolina, and the accident did not occur 
there.17 Goodyear thus appeared to be 
an easy case for the Court to overturn 
the assertion of general jurisdiction 
over the foreign subsidiaries. 
Yet Justice Ginsburg’s opinion went 
further to adopt a new due process 
requirement that a company must 
be essentially “at home” for a state 
to assert general jurisdiction over it, 
identifying the paradigm “home” as 
the company’s place of incorporation 
or principal place of business.18 The “at 
home” requirement was groundbreak-
ing because many courts had been 
finding general jurisdiction based on a 
company’s continuous and substantial 
“doing business” in states that were 
not the corporation’s “home.”19 Justice 
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Ginsburg herself later called the deci-
sion “pathmarking.”20
Then, three years later in Daimler,21 
the Court unanimously reversed a 
Ninth Circuit ruling that a California 
federal district court could exercise 
general personal jurisdiction over the 
German parent company, Daimler. 
That suit asserted federal Alien Tort 
Act and state law claims on behalf of 
22 Argentine plaintiffs alleging that 
Daimler’s Argentine subsidiary had 
been complicit in numerous human 
rights violations by the former 
Argentine government.22 
Although there obviously could not 
be specific jurisdiction in California 
for claims involving actions and 
harm in Argentina, the Ninth Circuit 
had upheld general jurisdiction over 
Daimler based on the substantial, con-
tinuous, and systematic contacts with 
California by Daimler and its prin-
cipal U.S. subsidiary, Mercedes Benz 
USA. Mercedes was a Delaware cor-
poration headquartered in New Jersey 
which owned and operated numer-
ous California facilities that sold 
and serviced more than ten percent 
of Daimler’s new cars nationwide.23 
Justice Ginsburg for the Court again 
held that general jurisdiction can be 
exercised only when a corporation 
is “essentially at home in the forum 
state.”24 In so holding, she specifically 
rejected the contention that a corpo-
ration’s engaging in a multi-billion 
dollar “substantial, continuous and 
systematic course of business” in a 
state not its “home” can be sufficient 
for general jurisdiction.25 She also 
emphasized that a company cannot 
fairly be treated as “at home” in every 
jurisdiction in which it has substan-
tial operations, as that would make 
every large multi-national corpora-
tion subject to all-purpose jurisdiction 
in every state.26 
Three years after Daimler, the Court 
in BNSF27 again applied the new bright-
line dichotomy to reject jurisdiction 
over Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
claims brought in Montana state court. 
In that case, the claims against the 
defendant railroad company were for 
injuries sustained outside Montana by 
two nonresident employee plaintiffs. 
In another opinion by Justice Ginsburg, 
the Court held that the company’s 
substantial contacts with the state — 
consisting of 2,000 miles of track and 
over 2,000 employees — were insuffi-
cient to satisfy due process. Neither 
of the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims 
arose from the company’s activities in 
Montana so as to allow specific juris-
diction, the Court explained, and the 
defendant company was neither incor-
porated nor had its principal place of 
business in the state so as to be “at 
home” for general jurisdiction.28
Bristol-Myers: The “Arise out of or 
Relate to” Requirement
In Bristol-Myers,29 the Supreme Court 
held that California lacked jurisdiction 
over 592 nonresident plaintiffs that had 
been joined with 86 California resident 
plaintiffs in eight coordinated “mass 
actions” against Bristol-Myers Squibb 
for injuries allegedly caused by the 
company’s drug Plavix.30 Justice Samuel 
Alito’s opinion followed the same 
general-specific jurisdiction dichot-
omy set out in Goodyear, Daimler, and 
BNSF. No one disputed that Bristol-
Myers Squibb maintained extensive 
and continuous multi-billion-dollar 
operations in California, including five 
research laboratory facilities employ-
ing approximately 160 employees and 
250 sales representatives, as well as 
a Sacramento advocacy office, sub-
stantial advertising, and hundreds of 
millions of dollars in annual sales of 
Plavix there. Nonetheless, the Court 
held that the only two states where 
general jurisdiction could be obtained 
over the company would be its states 
of incorporation (Delaware) and head-
quarters (New York).31
More fundamentally, the Court 
held that the California courts lacked 
“specific” jurisdiction over the 592 
nonresident plaintiffs because none 
of their claims bore any connection 
to any Bristol-Myers Squibb activi-
ties in California.32 The Court reasoned 
that under International Shoe, specific 
jurisdiction requires that the plaintiff’s 
suit must arise out of or relate to the 
defendants’ contacts with the forum; 
that is, there must be an “affiliation 
between the forum and the underlying 
controversy, principally, [an] activity 
or an occurrence that takes place in 
the forum State.” 33 It was undisputed 
that the company did not manufac-
ture, label, package, or manage the 
marketing or obtaining of regula-
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tory approval for Plavix in California. 
Moreover, the nonresident plaintiffs 
could not allege that they were injured 
in California or that they purchased or 
were prescribed their Plavix there.34
 The quartet of decisions were 
either unanimous (Goodyear, Daimler) 
or nearly unanimous (8-1 in BNSF 
and Bristol-Myers), demonstrating 
strong agreement on the new bright-
er-line approach that cuts across 
the Court’s other notable cleavages. 
Nevertheless, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
authored strongly worded dissents in 
Bristol-Myers and BNSF, as well as a 
concurrence in Daimler, arguing that 
the Court’s new, “more restrictive” 
approach will make it “more difficult,” 
and in some instances “impossible,” for 
plaintiffs to bring nationwide aggre-
gate actions addressing nationwide 
corporate conduct, particularly in 
cases involving small claims, foreign 
country corporate defendants, or two 
or more defendants that are “at home” 
in different states.35 
J. McIntyre: The “Fifty-State” 
Targeting Dilemma
The Court’s contemporaneous deci-
sion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro presented a significant issue: 
What about a corporation that targets 
the entire country with sales of a prod-
uct that causes injury to a plaintiff in a 
state in which the company otherwise 
has no significant contacts?36 The case 
divided the Court 4-2-3 in the same 
term as the unanimous Goodyear deci-
sion. A New Jersey plaintiff had been 
seriously injured by a metal shear-
ing machine produced by defendant, J. 
McIntyre. J. McIntyre was an English 
company that sold its machines for 
resale throughout the United States 
to an independent Ohio distribution 
company, which, in turn, structured 
its advertising and sales efforts with 
J. McIntyre’s guidance. J. McIntyre 
also attended annual industry conven-
tions in various states (but never New 
Jersey) to promote its machines along-
side its U.S. distributor. It also obtained 
U.S. patents for its machines.37 Yet 
only a handful of machines ended 
up in New Jersey. New Jersey’s high-
est court found personal jurisdiction 
over J. McIntyre on the ground that it 
placed its products into “the stream of 
commerce” and “knew or should have 
known that its products are distributed 
through a nationwide distribution sys-
tem that might lead to those products 
being sold in any of the fifty states.”38 
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s plurality opinion, 
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts 
and Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas, held that New Jersey 
lacked specific jurisdiction because 
there was no showing that the com-
pany “purposefully avail[ed] itself” of 
the “benefits and protections” of New 
Jersey by “target[ing]” its sales there, 
and that mere “foreseeability” that the 
company’s products will be sold in the 
state is insufficient. 39 
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by 
Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in 
the judgment because the company’s 
contacts with New Jersey were too iso-
lated. But Justice Breyer also noted that 
the global digital market may soon call 
upon the Court to recognize that the 
idea of “targeting” of a forum state will 
need to adapt to an age when foreign 
producers can easily sell goods nation-
ally and internationally through an 
intermediary such as Amazon.com.40 
Justice Ginsburg dissented in an opin-
ion joined by Justices Elena Kagan and 
Sotomayor, arguing that J. McIntyre’s 
nationwide targeting in essence sub-
sumed targeting New Jersey.41 
The decision is a difficult pill to swal-
low. As five of the justices noted, the 
“purposeful” contacts requirement 
should take on new meaning in the 
new global reality, in which compa-
nies may not intend for their products 
to reach any specific state, but plainly 
intend for them to reach all states. Yet 
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion 
points out that a blanket rule providing 
jurisdiction over any company target-
ing all 50 states would result in a small 
business in Appalachia being subject to 
jurisdiction in Hawaii for selling goods 
over the internet. Instead, he sug-
gested an approach that also requires 
that the forum be “fair” in light of the 
defendant’s contacts with that forum.42 
WALKING THE NEW BRIGHT 
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inherently problematic. But the danger 
is that this move will cause courts to 
abandon the International Shoe admo-
nition that “. . . the criteria by which 
we mark the boundary line between 
those activities which justify the sub-
jection of a corporation to suit, and 
those which do not, cannot be simply 
mechanical or quantitative.”43 For this 
reason, there should be flexibility in 
and around the new bright lines. 
Imagining “At Home” Test Flexibility 
In the case of the “at home” require-
ment, the Supreme Court has already 
made clear that there may be sit-
uations that will allow for general 
jurisdiction beyond the paradigm sce-
narios.44 In Daimler, the Court pointed 
to its 1952 decision in Perkins v. 
Benguet Consol. Mining Co. as an exam-
ple of flexibility in its “essentially at 
home” requirement. There, the Court 
determined that because a Philippines 
corporation’s president had temporar-
ily moved management to Ohio during 
World War II, general jurisdiction over 
the company was satisfied.45 
One can similarly imagine other sce-
narios in which a corporate defendant 
might properly be found to be “essen-
tially at home” for purposes of general 
jurisdiction in states other than its 
paradigm places of incorporation and 
principal place of business: (1) a corpo-
ration has two (or three) headquarters 
or principal locations;46 (2) a corpora-
tion’s executive headquarters is in a 
different state than its principal oper-
ations center;47 (3) a conglomerate 
corporation has separately managed 
“divisions” headquartered in different 
states, and the lawsuit involves one 
such “division” in the forum state; or 
(4) for large multinational corpora-
tions incorporated and headquartered 
in other countries, “quasi-at home” 
general jurisdiction might be found 
in the state of their U.S. headquarters 
(e.g., the state of incorporation or the 
headquarters of the company’s princi-
pal U.S. subsidiary) for injuries caused 
to U.S. residents. Of course, in the last 
two posited categories, it is possible 
that plaintiffs may be able to obtain spe-
cific jurisdiction in the state if they can 
show that the division headquarters or 
U.S. headquarters at issue was respon-
sible for managing the development, 
design, production, marketing, testing, 
or distribution of the complained-of 
product, service, or communication.
Imagining “Arising out of or Relating 
to” Test Flexibility 
Correspondingly, for specific jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court has not yet 
defined the claim-connection phrase 
“arise out of or relate to,” which orig-
inated in International Shoe.48 As a 
matter of pure linguistic construction, 
the phrase allows for two alterna-
tives: “arising out of,” which is causal in 
nature, or “relating to,” which denotes a 
logical connection. Yet not just any log-
ical connection should suffice: We know 
that International Shoe and its progeny 
require some purposeful conduct in or 
towards the forum bringing about the 
claim such that a reasonable defendant 
would appreciate that its conduct could 
subject it to jurisdiction in the forum.49 
The sole jurisdictional due process 
defect overturned in Bristol-Myers 
was the inclusion in that case of 592 
plaintiffs without any claim connec-
tion to the state whatsoever.50 But 
the requirement for a claim connec-
tion should still allow for a range of 
approaches to specific jurisdiction, 
provided that the claims of all plain-
tiffs in the case are logically connected 
to the defendant’s purposeful contacts 
with the state. 
For example, courts could, consis-
tent with due process, apply a broader 
“but for” claim-connection test, per-
mitting jurisdiction in a state in which 
the plaintiff’s alleged injuries would 
not have occurred “but for” the defen-
dant’s contacts with the state.51 In an 
action alleging that significant case- 
related clinical-trial testing used to 
obtain regulatory approval for an 
allegedly defective drug occurred in the 
forum state, jurisdiction could arguably 
be based on the claim connection that 
the drug could not have been sold “but 
for” such testing.52 Or plaintiffs who 
purchased tickets sold and advertised in 
their state for a tour or event in another 
state at which they were injured could 
sue the tour or event company in their 
state based on the claim connection 
that “but for” the defendant’s in-state 
advertising and ticket sales, the injury 
would not have occurred.53 In both 
examples, the defendant company’s 
due process “liberty interest” in being 
required to respond to claims only in 
fora in which it could reasonably expect 
to be sued would be satisfied because 
every plaintiff’s claim would be “but 
for” connected to the company’s con-
tacts with the forum state.54 The state 
would also have an adequate “sover-
eign” interest to justify its exercise of 
judicial power over a company with 
such contacts.55 Moreover, there would 
be no Bristol-Myers forum shopping 
problem because all plaintiffs would be 
linked by the “but for” claim connection 
to the forum. 
Some have criticized the “but for” 
test as being too broad, since it could 
arguably encompass every contact 
identified along an incident’s causative 
chain regardless of how substantially 
related to the injury.56 Most courts 
(at least before the Supreme Court’s 
decision quartet) have applied either a 
“proximate cause” or “substantial rela-
tion” test, both of which require a more 
rigorous claim-connection with the u
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forum. Certainly, states are free to 
apply these stricter tests.57 Yet many of 
the courts that applied these stricter 
tests for specific jurisdiction were also 
utilizing the more jurisdiction-friendly 
“doing business” tests for general 
jurisdiction — essentially using gen-
eral jurisdiction as a corrective “safety 
valve” outlet to address poor outcomes 
from overly strict specific jurisdic-
tion tests.58 Now that the Supreme 
Court has removed this “safety valve” 
by substantially constraining general 
jurisdiction, courts should be vigilant in 
not blindly applying an overly restric-
tive claim-connection test that would 
deprive deserving plaintiffs of access 
to a reasonable forum. 
Furthermore, in today’s era of the 
internet and other similar mass mar-
keting tools, the J. McIntyre 50-state 
targeting dilemma should be solved 
by treating any company’s regular and 
systematic targeting of product sales 
and marketing to all 50 states as “pur-
poseful” targeting in any state in which 
the plaintiff is injured. This treatment 
should also be subject to a “reasonable-
ness” analysis as to the fairness to the 
defendant of the state exercising juris-
diction in the particular case.59
It should be stressed that each of 
the Supreme Court’s quartet of cases 
addressed problematic forum shop-
ping; the plaintiffs had no strong 
grounds to bring the dismissed claims 
in the forum state. In Goodyear, plain-
tiffs brought suit in North Carolina 
against foreign companies for an 
accident that occurred in a foreign 
country involving tires that were man-
ufactured abroad.60 In Daimler, it was 
Argentine plaintiffs suing a German 
company in California for conduct that 
occurred in Argentina.61 In BNSF,  it was 
nonresident plaintiffs bringing employ-
ment-related claims in Montana that 
did not arise there and in which BNSF 
was not at home or even “quasi-at 
home.”62 And, in Bristol-Myers, it was 
hundreds of nonresident plaintiffs 
whose claims were totally unconnected 
with California.63 Read in this light, the 
decision quartet provides greater sim-
plicity and clarity of construct for due 
process jurisdictional analysis, along 
with a strong message against forum 
shopping abuse. But the quartet deci-
sions should still leave our courts with 
the necessary flexibility to allow for 
application of the “at home” and “aris-
ing out of or related to” requirements 
in a manner that protects jurisdictional 
access to our courts in accordance with 
our “traditional conceptions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”64 
Class Actions Still Fit the New Shoe
In her Bristol-Myers dissent, Justice 
Sotomayor asked whether nationwide 
class actions may be at risk. Her con-
cern was that corporate defendants 
would now argue that specific juris-
diction in class actions would require 
a claim-connection with the state for 
each of the absent putative class mem-
bers.65 The justice was right about the 
challenges to come: Corporate defen-
dants have indeed taken this position 
in a number of nationwide and multi-
state class actions since Bristol-Myers. 
Yet, in the final analysis, there are a 
number of reasons why the class action 
vehicle should not be compromised by 
the Court’s decision quartet. 
First, in a nationwide or multistate 
class action, a strong argument can 
be made that only the named plain-
tiffs — not the absent class members 
— should be considered as the plaintiffs 
for purposes of determining the court’s 
jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers. The 
Supreme Court has already held that 
absent class members may be deemed 
parties only for some purposes, and not 
for others.66 To determine traditional 
diversity jurisdiction in a class action 
under 28 USC § 1332(a), for example, it 
is well settled that the Court will only 
look to the citizenship of the named 
plaintiffs, not to absent class members.67 
There is logic to this distinction between 
joined named plaintiffs and absent class 
members: In a Bristol-Myers-type mass 
action case, where there are hundreds 
of nonresident plaintiffs joined in a 
mass tort action, the defendant must 
investigate, discover, and litigate each 
plaintiff’s claim on issues like causation, 
individual physician’s advice, poten-
tial misuse, and damages. In a certified 
class action, by contrast, predominant 
common legal and factual issues are, by 
definition, mostly focused on the defen-
dant and are presented by the named 
representative plaintiffs with virtually 
no participation by, or discovery from, 
absent class members. 
Several post-Bristol-Myers federal 
district court decisions have confined 
the specific jurisdiction analysis in 
class actions to just the named plain-
tiffs on essentially these grounds.68 
However, others courts have applied 
Bristol-Myers to dismiss class action 
claims brought on behalf of out-of-
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state absent class members, principally 
on the grounds that the Rules Enabling 
Act prohibits Federal Rule 23 from 
being applied to abridge a defendant’s 
substantive due process right not to 
be subject to jurisdiction in a state for 
any nonresident’s claims (even those 
of absent class members) that have no 
connection to the state.69
The Supreme Court’s groundbreak-
ing 1985 class action decision in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (authored by 
Justice William Rehnquist)70 was the 
first to uphold the very concept of 
a state court adjudicating a nation-
wide class action. Shutts also provides 
support for analyzing jurisdiction 
in class actions by reference only to 
the named plaintiffs, even though 
the Supreme Court’s Bristol-Myers 
decision declined to find the case 
persuasive with respect to the Bristol-
Myers plaintiffs in that mass action 
(not class action) case.71 
Shutts influences how class actions 
are litigated to this day, holding for the 
first time that a state court can adjudi-
cate a nationwide class action without 
first obtaining jurisdiction over the 
absent plaintiff class members. The 
Court reasoned that due process did 
not require the same “minimum con-
tacts” protections for absent class 
members as for a defendant, noting 
that absent class members are not bur-
dened in the litigation in the same way 
as a defendant: they are not haled into 
court; they do not need to fear dam-
ages or penalty; and they are, at least in 
money-damages actions, given notice 
and the right to opt out, along with the 
safeguard of a court approval require-
ment and an opportunity to be heard 
for any proposed class settlement. 
Moreover, absent class members 
are protected by the representative 
nature of the class action through the 
class certification process.72 
 Thus, Shutts can be read to support 
the proposition that, generally, only the 
named plaintiffs’ claims should be con-
sidered in the jurisdictional analysis 
because absent plaintiff class members 
are not parties to the same degree, do 
not present defendants with the same 
burdens, and are being represented by 
the named plaintiffs through a rigor-
ous class certification procedure.  
It is proposed that, in class actions, 
courts should adopt a presump-
tion in favor of specific jurisdiction 
based solely on the named plaintiffs’ 
claim-connections to the forum state, 
but the presumption should be subject 
to a defendant’s demonstration that 
the state has an insufficient connec-
tion to absent class members to satisfy 
the “reasonableness” requirement for 
the exercise of specific jurisdiction. 
After all, plaintiffs’ class counsel 
should not, as a matter of “fair play and 
substantial justice,” be able to choose 
a state as the forum for a nationwide 
class action based on only a few in-state 
named plaintiffs and little else to tie 
the defendant to the forum.  Of course, 
in a nationwide class action, any one 
state generally will not have a huge 
percentage of class members as com-
pared to the entire remainder of the 
country, but what could be shown to 
be unreasonable is for the state to have 
an insignificant number of class mem-
bers beyond the named plaintiffs. Due 
process requires that the defendant’s 
contacts “reasonably” support the exer-
cise of jurisdiction, taking into account 
the burdens on the defendant.73 
More fundamentally, regardless of 
how the present litigation over how 
to apply Bristol-Myers to absent class 
members is resolved, there should 
be little reason for concern over the 
continued viability of class actions 
alleging nationwide corporate miscon-
duct. Plaintiffs’ class counsel can use at 
least three approaches in future cases 
to support personal jurisdiction over a 
nationwide plaintiff class action under 
even the least jurisdiction-friendly 
reading of Bristol-Myers: 
1. Class plaintiffs can obtain specific 
jurisdiction for a nationwide class 
in a state in which the defendant 
company has developed, designed, 
produced, tested, or from which 
it has distributed the offending 
product, packaging or communi-
cation. For a consumer contract 
case, the forum could be the cor-
poration’s place of contracting.74 
2. Class plaintiffs can also obtain gen-
eral jurisdiction in the defendant’s 
“at home” state of incorporation 
or principal place of business. If 
there is more than one defendant, 
the issue can become more com-
plicated, but there should often 
It is proposed that, in 
class actions, courts 
should adopt a 
presumption in favor 
of specific jurisdiction 
based solely on the 
named plaintiffs’ claim-
connections to the 
forum state, but the 
presumption should be 
subject to a defendant’s 
demonstration that the 
state has an insufficient 
connection to absent 
class members to satisfy 
the “reasonableness” 
requirement. 
u
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be overlap in at least one state 
among the potential specific juris-
diction and general jurisdiction 
states that would encompass all 
defendants. Moreover, for mul-
tiple corporate defendants who 
have allegedly engaged in wrong-
doing together, jurisdiction could 
potentially also lie in the states 
where they engaged together in 
the alleged wrongdoing. 
3. For federal securities,75 antitrust,76 
ERISA,77 and certain other federal 
claims,78 there is nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction available in the 
federal district courts via nation-
wide service of process statutes, 
and, therefore, nationwide class 
actions are potentially available 
for these significant claim areas. 
The federal district court will also 
have supplemental subject matter 
jurisdiction over state law claims 
joined in the action.79 Indeed, one 
unintended result of the decision 
quartet may be to encourage plain-
tiffs’ counsel to search for such 
federal claims to provide nation-
wide jurisdiction. 
Thus, if plaintiffs’ class counsel are 
mindful in their forum selection pro-
cess, the issue of nonresident absent 
class members should not present 
significant jurisdictional issues going 
forward. 
Indeed, there are other protections 
to prevent plaintiffs’ class counsel from 
pursuing nationwide class actions in a 
forum state in which absent class mem-
bers’ claims bear no real connection 
to the state. Shutts itself had a second 
holding in addition to its upholding 
a state court’s power to adjudicate a 
nationwide class action. That second 
holding makes clear, as later reinforced 
by subsequent circuit decisions, that 
due process prevents application of the 
forum state’s law to a multistate class 
action for nonresident class members 
whose claims are not connected to the 
state.80 Plaintiffs’ counsel who attempt 
to squeeze too many different applica-
ble state laws into one nationwide or 
multistate class action risk losing the 
all-important class certification motion 
for lack of predominance of common 
issues.81 If the courts and the Supreme 
Court do adopt the proposed personal 
jurisdiction analysis for class actions 
that presumptively looks only to the 
plaintiff class representatives for spe-
cific jurisdiction, this should further 
underscore the important gate-keep-
ing function of the class certification 
motion.
Shoe Repair: Statutory or 
Federal Rule Fixes for the 
Decision Quartet and J. McIntyre? 
It bears noting that the recent Supreme 
Court decision quartet and J. McIntyre 
have propelled a number of propos-
als from the academy to provide for 
nationwide federal court personal 
jurisdiction for diversity of citizenship 
or alienage (foreign defendant citi-
zenship) cases. One proposal calls for 
the change to be made in Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).82 Other pro-
posals call for congressional statutory 
authorization of nationwide federal 
district court jurisdiction in such cases, 
together with new venue provisions 
to fairly locate actions among the dis-
trict courts. These statutory proposals 
stem largely from the concern that 
a simple Rule amendment impact-
ing personal jurisdiction could violate 
the 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) Rules Enabling 
Act’s proscription against Rules that 
would modify or abridge a substantive 
right.83 The governing assumption of 
all of these proposals is that the Fifth 
Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth 
Amendment governing the states, 
would allow for nationwide personal 
jurisdiction over all such claims.84 The 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of 
Procedure, at its April 10, 2018, meet-
ing, discussed the issue but opted to 
defer active work on such changes for 
future consideration.85
CONCLUSION:  
A PREMIUM ON EARLY STEPS
Following the decision quartet and 
J. McIntyre, there is a premium on 
plaintiffs’ counsel getting personal 
jurisdiction right at the outset. These 
decisions also should propel thought-
ful counsel on both sides to try to 
reach agreements that avoid unnec-
essary jurisdictional disputes. As a 
former longtime large-case litigator, 
I teach my Complex Civil Litigation 
students that it is often in both sides’ 
interests from a cost-effectiveness 
standpoint to try to reach early agree-
ment on personal jurisdiction issues 
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